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Civic Religion and Shifting Trajectories in Context of 
Religious Symbols, Practices, and Prayer 
 
 
Christopher Daniel Cardoso 
 
I. Introduction 
 When one thinks of the relationship between religion and the United States government, 
immediately coming to mind is typically the age-old adage that has been popularized in our society 
and paraphrased from the words of Thomas Jefferson: separation of church and state. It is easy to 
assume that this would mean government is to have no interaction at all with religion, and that 
religious exercise should be left to the people that comprise this nation. After all, the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution does forbid government from making laws which 
concern the establishment of religion and from prohibiting the free exercise of religious beliefs.1 
But does the Constitution really require, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, the building of “a wall 
of separation between church and state,”2 or can there exist some sort of relationship between 
government and religious practice that does not violate one of the country’s original and most 
fundamental laws? 
One category of thought that may fall within the latter supposition is the concept of “civil” 
or “civic” religion. Scholar John A. Coleman describes civic religion as “a special case of the 
religious symbol system, designed to perform a differentiated function which is the unique 
province of neither church nor state. It is a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man as 
citizen and his society in world history to the ultimate conditions of his existence.”3 It is essentially 
 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1-2. 
2 January 1, 1802, letter by Thomas Jefferson addressed to the Danbury Baptist Association (in Connecticut) 
3 John A. Coleman, Civil Religion, 31 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 67–77, 69 (1970). 
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the theory that there exists a distinct religious “flavor,” if you will, embedded in American culture 
and government. It is the idea that there is a certain level of harmony between government and 
religion. It is also the notion that some sort of religious practice is allowable by the Constitution 
and the Judiciary even in contexts where there is some governmental involvement, be it through 
specific acts, practices, or functions. And some examples of civic religion can be visualized in 
occurrences that many would see in everyday life, such as “In God We Trust” on our currency and 
Christmas decorations seen while walking through town during the holiday season. 
Another scholarly article by Ronald C. Wimberley and James A. Christenson adds to this 
understanding by positing that civil religion operates in its own form of limbo, and stating “because 
civil religion is considered to be neither a sectarian religion nor a formal part of American 
government, and because civil religion appears to have no companion organization exclusively on 
its own, civil religion would appear outside the domain of conflict with the principle of church-
state or religion-government separation.”4 While the thesis may be true, two issues can be found 
within such a statement. The first is whether certain religious entanglements by government that 
have civic meaning are actually without conflict with respect to the First Amendment’s 
protections. The second is whether these entanglements have formed its own domain free from the 
limitations of the Constitution.  
With respect to the first issue, nothing is free from conflict. As will be seen in the following 
discussion, the Supreme Court has heard and contemplated a number of issues regarding religious 
entanglements that have civic meaning. The second issue with Wimberley and Christenson’s 
statement, however, is more complex. Have these occurrences, which involve religious 
entanglement and civic meaning, had their own little bubble of protection carved out by the 
 
4 Ronald C. Wimberley & James A. Christenson, Civil Religion and Church and State, 21 THE SOCIOLOGICAL 
QUARTERLY 35–40, 39 (1980). 
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Judiciary through Constitutional interpretation? The answer to this question, generally, is yes, but 
this area outside of conflict with the Constitution has its own bounds. The Court has been tolerant 
of government entanglements that have civic meaning, but only when other justifications exist for 
those entanglements. An effigy of tablets inscribed with the Ten Commandments can stand on the 
grounds of the National Mall if it is depicted within a display of the foundations of American 
government and its laws. To the contrary, the same tablets would not have the Court’s support if 
found hanging alone, lacking external context, on the wall of a public classroom. 
The focus of this paper will be partly to show the extent of the Supreme Court’s tolerance 
of these government entanglements that have civic meaning. Without doubt, the Court has allowed 
many practices to continue despite their connections, both intimate and remote, with religion. But 
another focal point of the paper will be to shine a light on the trajectories that certain practices 
with civic meaning have taken and may take in consideration of (and at times despite) the opinions 
of the Court. Some practices have waned, some have lost their religious significance, some are 
now seen in different light, some continue on as strong as ever. Particular attention will be paid to 
three distinct lines of cases by the Court: Sunday Blue Laws, religious symbols on public land, 
and prayer in government settings. 
 
II. The Movement from Religious to Secular and Civic Meaning: Sunday Closing Laws 
and Religious Symbols 
Sunday Closing Laws and religious symbols on public land do not have a great deal in 
common. One is a law historically put into place to free up time for worship and devotion to God 
in the Christian tradition. The other may be a depiction of religious text, a figure of import to a 
particular sect, or a token of celebration during a set time of year. Nonetheless, they find likeness 
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in one significant respect: they stem from overtly religious underpinnings but have evolved to take 
on newer secularized values and, in some instances, have lost their divine connotations altogether. 
These practices have not only taken on new understandings that are secular in nature but 
have also begun to decline in the frequency of their use. Also, some practices that have previously 
been allowed, by their very nature would not be allowable today, owing to the fact that they have 
not yet lost their religious nature. The following sections will delve into both Sunday Closing Laws 
and religious symbols on public land, their history with and treatment by the Supreme Court, and 
the direction in which these practices appear to be trending. 
 
A. Sunday Blue Laws have Secular Benefits to Society 
The Supreme Court, in its definitive decisions in the early 1960s, has determined that 
Sunday Blue Laws, despite their initially religious motivations and in some instances still 
potentially aiding religious practice, do not violate the Establishment Clause due to the secular 
benefits that the laws may also serve. 
Sunday Blue Laws or Sunday Closing Laws, generally speaking, are pieces of state 
legislation that prohibit labor, commercial activities, recreational activities, and the purchase of 
certain consumer goods on Sundays. Examples of this type of law would be New Jersey’s 
forbiddance of the sale of automobiles on Sundays or Bergen County, New Jersey’s restriction on 
the sale of clothing and electronics on Sundays. While the purposes for the continued use of these 
laws are not clear from the outset, the history and initial intention of these laws has been elaborated 
upon the Supreme Court in McGowan v. Maryland.5 The Court, in its decision, expresses that the 
origins of Sunday Blue Laws in the United States can be traced back to legislation established in 
 
5 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
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England with the intent of aiding the established church in the nation.6 These restrictions imposed 
by the British were then brought over to the New World not long after settlement began.7 
Beginning in 1650, laws prohibiting sport, labor, unnecessary travel, and the sale of alcohol, as 
well as enforcing mandatory church attendance were implemented in the Plymouth Colony.8 These 
laws were designed with the intention of freeing Sunday, which is the Sabbath Day for most 
Christian denominations, from other forms of activity so it can be dedicated as a day of worship. 
 Despite the clearly religious motivations for the implementation of these Sunday Laws and 
belief by some that this practice violated the theory of church-state separation, the Supreme Court, 
in 1961, decided to take on the McGowan case to clarify their understanding of the issue. 
McGowan centers around a challenge by seven employees of an Anne Arundel County, Maryland 
department store after they were charged with violating a Maryland statute that proscribed the 
Sunday sale of any products other that certain perishable foods, tobacco, gasoline, medicine, and 
newspaper.9 The appellants argued that the laws violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment because the point of the legislation was to enforce stoppage of labor in an effort to 
encourage church attendance, since Sunday is the day of worship for many Christians.10 
 The Court, choosing not to follow the argument posited by the appellants, upheld the 
constitutionality of Maryland’s Sunday laws and provided two central justifications for doing so.11 
The most compelling justification hypothesized by the Court is that these laws have slowly begun 
 
6 Id. at 433. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 The employees in the case were charged because they had sold a three-ring loose-leaf binder, floor wax, a stapler 
and staples, and a toy submarine. The Court notes that a number of sports (such as football, baseball, golf, hockey, 
and soccer) and recreational activities (including hunting and fishing) were also prohibited on Sundays by other 
Maryland statutes. Id. at 422-24. 
10 Id. at 431. 
11 Id. at 453. 
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to lose their religious meaning and have taken on more secular considerations.12 A secular purpose 
to justify a legislature’s implementation of Sunday Laws, in the eyes of the Court, would be that 
Sunday should be a day of rest, one that would allow people to recover from the past week’s work 
and prepare for the next, as well as being a common day on which family, friends, and relatives 
can spend time together, take in entertainment, and go out to dinner.13 After all, state governments 
have the authority to regulate the “improvement of the health, safety, recreation, and general well-
being of its citizens.”14 The Court subsequently argues that “to say that the States cannot prescribe 
Sunday as a day of rest for these purposes solely because centuries ago such laws had their genesis 
in religion would give a constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare rather than 
one of mere separation of church and State.”15 It seems that the Court is choosing to favor the 
public benefits potentially associated with these enactments instead of lingering on the fact that 
the basis for these laws had been to promote religious practice. The argument is still compelling 
to this day, because in the trials and pace of modern society, it is often times difficult to slow down 
and have a day to rest and relax. Limited activity, with the exception of entertainment, can be 
beneficial to one’s mental and emotional health, as well as their relationships with others. 
 A second justification provided by the Court in McGowan is that “the Establishment Clause 
does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to 
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.”16 Illustrations of the Court’s point 
can be found in American criminal law. Murder, theft, prostitution, fraud, and polygamy are all 
criminal offenses in many or all states and the federal government. These unlawful acts are also 
 
12 Id. at 434. 
13 Id. at 434, 450-52. 
14 Id. at 444-45. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 442. 
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morally reprehensible under the beliefs of many religious groups, such as various denominations 
of Christianity, Judaism, and Islamic faith. The Court is correct in contending that these laws 
outlawing illicit conduct should not be invalidated merely because they align with religious tenets 
or may have originated in what some would deem sacred texts. To do so, we would have to 
invalidate many a law that have a foundation in the common law, since much of the law in this 
country has its foundation in English common law; England is a country itself which has an 
established church and religious motivations were prevalent in the creation of parts of its legal 
doctrine (as evidenced by the early history of Sunday laws). 
 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., another decision handed down by the 
Supreme Court in the same year, followed the decision in McGowan v. Maryland.17 The case in 
Gallagher centers around a corporation owned by members of Orthodox Jewish faith that sells 
kosher meats and food products mostly to Orthodox Jewish customers.18 Under tenets of the 
Orthodox Jewish faith, the Sabbath is from Friday at sundown to Saturday at sundown and 
members of the faith are not allowed to perform commercial activity during that time.19 Due to 
this closure, Crown Kosher chose to open its doors for business on Sundays, which brought in a 
third of its weekly earnings, against a Massachusetts Sunday Blue Law that forbids the doing of 
any business or work on Sundays.20 The store owners challenged the law on various grounds, 
including an argument that the law violated the Establishment Clause.21 Although the fact patterns 
of this case and the McGowan case may seem similar from the outset, the two differ in the fact that 
the Massachusetts law in this case makes use of much more Christian language than that of the 
 
17 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 630 (1961). 
18 Id. at 618. 
19 Id. at 619. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 624. 
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Maryland law in McGowan. The provisions challenged by the store owners are included under a 
chapter of the statute titled “Observance of the Lord’s Day.”22 Additionally, the provisions 
underwent a number of revisions after they were enacted, initially using terms such as “Sabbath”, 
“Lord’s Day”, “dishonour of God”, and “Grief of the Spirits of God’s People.”23 Later, the 
provisions were reworded, leaving only references to “the Lord’s Day” as well as taking into 
account the welfare and relaxation of the community.24 
 Undeterred by the plentiful use of Christian verbiage even in the latest edition of the 
provision, the Court in Gallagher still chose to adhere to the precedent set in McGowan.25 It found 
that although some provisions still contained references to religion, the statutes “have been 
divorced from the religious orientation of their predecessors.”26 According to Chief Justice 
Warren, the language in question is simply a relic of the older versions of the statutes and the 
current scheme provides “an atmosphere of recreation rather than religion,” owing to the fact that 
the current version provides exemptions for sports and recreation.27 
 Furthermore, the case of Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, continues the 
trend set by McGowan.28 In this case, a large Pennsylvania discount department store’s employees 
were cited multiple times for violating a section of the Pennsylvania Penal Code, which forbids 
employment, business, and sport on Sundays.29 The section of the code had been recently amended 
to contain exemptions for “wholesome recreation.”30 The Appellant had sought an injunction in 
an attempt to prevent the District Attorney from enforcing the Sunday Closing Law, arguing that 
 
22 Id. at 619. 
23 Id. at 625-26. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 626. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 626-27. 
28 Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). 
29 Id. at 585. 
30 The case itself also lists a number of activities that were included in the definition of wholesome recreation. Id. 
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it is a law respecting the establishment of religion because it honors the doctrine of Christian 
religious groups in forcing abstinence from work, it commemorates the Resurrection, and 
encourages Christian worship.31 
 The Two Guys Court acknowledged that a connection undoubtedly existed between the 
original Pennsylvania Sunday Closing statutes and religion, and also recognized that the current 
laws contained indications of religious influence, yet chose to go in the same direction as the other 
two Sunday Blue Law cases, ultimately upholding the validity of the laws.32 Part of its reason 
follows the above cases, but it also focuses on the amendments made to the statutes.33 The Court 
found that the addition of healthful and recreational exercises to the list of allowable Sunday 
activities shows that the Sunday Closing statutes are no longer there to promote religious 
practice.34 The inclusion of such activities is not consistent with aiding church attendance, as the 
appellant suggested was the reason for the laws, but may even be seen as inconsistent, in that 
people have the option to pursue endeavors other than participating in religious exercise.35 
 In viewing these three cases on Sunday Blue Laws, it is clear that the Supreme Court is 
extremely willing to look past the obviously religious origins of this type of law, instead aiming 
its attention at the secular and civic benefits to be gained from such laws. To the Court, simply 
having a historically religious origin, using religious verbiage, or desiring to achieve a moral end 
that mirrors that of some or all religious groups is not enough to reach unconstitutionality. The 
Court is not willing to deter action where religion had plainly figured in legislative decision-
making (albeit having played its part in the past) if that action is far removed from such religious 
 
31 Id. at 586, 592. 
32 Id. at 592-595. 
33 Id. at 595. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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motivations and such legislation can provide notable benefits to society that are not attributable to 
religion in and of themselves. 
 
B. Religious Displays on Public Property can be Contextualized as Having Separate 
Secular Meaning 
Context must be in full focus when looking at the constitutionality of religious displays 
located on public land. As long as the displays have a secular purpose to their existence on public 
land or are accompanied by other religious and secular symbols, the symbols themselves are 
permitted under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment. 
Religious displays are symbols or objects that have meaning in one or many religious belief 
systems. These symbols vary widely, from a cross to a menorah to a nativity scene to the Ten 
Commandments. They can come in the form of decorations, memorials, and statues, among others. 
Considering the restrictions on government imposed by the Establishment Clause, one would not 
think to find these symbols on public land. Yet, by taking a drive through town during the holiday 
season, it is not uncommon to find decorations with initially religious connotations all over the 
place, including ones put up by the local municipality. If you walk into a Courthouse, you may 
find homages to all that influenced this nation and its laws, including ones with religious roots. 
However, these practices have not gone without challenge. 
The Supreme Court’s first major case on the issue of religious displays on public land 
occurred in Lynch v. Donnelly. The dispute in the Lynch case began with an annual Christmas 
display in the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island.36 The display was put up in cooperation between 
the city and a local merchant’s association and was set up in a park (owned by a non-profit 
 
36 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). 
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organization) located in the middle of the city’s shopping district.37 The display included Santa’s 
house and sleigh, decorative candy canes, a Christmas tree, figures of carolers, cutouts of other 
characters, lighting, and a large banner with the message “Seasons Greetings.”38 Also included in 
the display was a creche consisting of the traditional Christian figures: Jesus, Mary, Joseph, 
shepherds, kings, angels, and animals.39 Pawtucket residents and the American Civil Liberties 
Union brought suit in federal court over inclusion of the creche, alleging a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.40 
The Supreme Court in this case decided in favor of allowing the creche as constitutional.41 
The central reason behind this decision was context, because if focus is only put on the religious 
aspects of any activity then everything would be invalidated under the Establishment Clause.42 
The Court, in this case, found validity in the context surrounding the creche by viewing it in the 
context of the holiday season.43 The Court notes that Christmas is a “historical religious event long 
celebrated in the Western World” and that the creche itself is simply a representation of that 
event.44 Additionally, Christmas has been recognized as a national holiday.45 Chief Justice Burger 
writes in the majority opinion, “display of the creche is no more an advancement or endorsement 
of religion than the Congressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as 
 
37 Id. Although the display in this case was not actually on publicly owned land, the fact that it is owned by the 
municipality and the municipality bears the costs of putting up and dismantling the display allows the Court’s 
arguments to fit within this category of discussion. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. Creches are also known as nativity scenes. The two terms will be used interchangeably. The creche in this case 
had been included in the display for over 40 years and was owned by the city for the last 10 years. The City of 
Pawtucket purchased the nativity scene for $1365 and spent $20 each year to erect and dismantle it. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 687. 
42 Id. at 679-80. 
43 Id. at 679. 
44 Id. at 680. The Court later points out that the holiday has been recognized for over 20 centuries in the Western 
World and has been recognized by all three branches of federal government for over 2 centuries. Id. at 686. 
45 Id. at 680. 
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‘Christ's Mass.’”46 The creche is only a passive reminder of the origins of Christmas.47 Even other 
displays that have been deemed by the Court as purely secular representations of Christmas, such 
as the Christmas tree, would lead one to recall the true nature of the holiday.48 
The Court also asks that the creche be viewed in context with other lines of cases, 
specifically making mention of Sunday Blue Laws. The Court argues that to assume a creche 
advances religion in violation of the Constitution would require viewing it as more of an 
endorsement of religion than Sunday Closing Laws which also have purely religious origins.49 
To add to its view that context should be given to religious displays, the Court also makes 
an argument that what should also be looked to is the purpose of the displays. According to the 
Court, “[it] has invalidated legislation or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose 
was lacking, but only when it has concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was 
motivated wholly by religious considerations.”50 The Court finds in Lynch that the City’s purpose 
of sponsoring the display to celebrate the holiday and depict its origins are valid secular reasons 
for erecting the display.51 
 Cases concerning nativity scenes are not the only ones heard by the Supreme Court in the 
realm of religious figures on public land. The Court has also heard two potential entanglements 
via use of the Ten Commandments, both decided on the same day. The first of these cases was 
Van Orden v. Perry. In this case, a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments was placed 
on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol.52 The figure itself was on a 22-acre plot of land that 
contained 17 monuments and 21 other historical markers, all of which were of objects and concepts 
 
46 Id. at 683. 
47 Id. at 685. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 681-82. 
50 Id. at 680. 
51 Id. at 681. 
52 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005). 
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that helped to form the Texan identity.53 The display not only included the two tablets that 
contained the Ten Commandments, which was questioned in the case, but also an eagle holding 
an American flag, an eye inside of a pyramid, two Stars of David, and two Greek letters that 
represented Christ.54 
 The Court decided that although the monument displaying the Ten Commandments had 
religious significance, it had “undeniable historical meaning” as well.55 The text is religious, but 
it was also an important influence in the State’s legal and political history.56 To help illustrate the 
importance of the text, not just in Texas but for the nation as a whole, the Court laid out numerous 
examples of passive monuments. Inside the Supreme Court building, and among other lawgivers, 
a statue of Moses has stood holding two tablets inscribed with portions of the Ten Commandments; 
representations of the Commandments are the North and South Gates of the Courtroom; a statue 
of Moses sits in the Library of Congress’ Jefferson Building; a medallion with the Commandments 
is on the floor of the National Archives; a statue with the tablets can be found in the Department 
of Justice; Moses is also depicted in the Chamber for the United States House of Representatives.57 
These examples serve to show the enormous relevance that some religious figures hold with 
respect to the nation’s history and laws. Ultimately, the Court found that the Ten Commandments 
depicted in the monument at the Texas Capitol did not rise to a level of religious entanglement to 
violate the spirit of the First Amendment.58 
 Just as influential was Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Van Orden. Justice Breyer 
stressed that religious symbols must be viewed in context, not just in isolation, to establish their 
 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 690. 
56 Id. at 691-92. 
57 Id. at 688-89. 
58 Id. at 691-92. 
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larger purpose.59 He stressed that the display should be viewed as a whole and that the purpose 
behind its construction should be taken into consideration.60 In this particular instance, the 
monument was given to the State by the Fraternal Order of Eagles to “highlight the 
Commandments’ role in shaping civic morality as part of the organization’s efforts to combat 
juvenile delinquency.”61 Additionally, he states the monument’s location amongst other 
monuments suggests that nothing of a religious nature was meant by its being included.62 All 
monuments were on the grounds to “illustrate the ideals of those who settled in Texas and of those 
who have lived there since that time.”63 Lastly, for Justice Breyer, the context of the monument 
having stood for 40 years without issue was also determinative.64 That span of time, and the 6 
years that the petitioner regularly walked past the figure, would suggest that few people would 
have inferred the exhibit to be a government effort to advance or compel the practice of one 
particular religion.65 
 In contrast to both the majority and Justice Breyer’s opinions in Van Orden, McCreary 
County v. American Civil Liberties Union struck down the use of the Ten Commandments.66 The 
Court made this determination by once again looking to the purpose of the displays.67 The displays 
in question were copies of the King James Version of the Ten Commandments.68 In McCreary 
County, the text was ordered to be posted in a high traffic area of the courthouse; in Pulaski County 
the text was unveiled in a ceremony that was presided over by a pastor and included the county 
 
59 Id. at 701, 703. 
60 Id. at 701. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 702. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005). 
67 Id. at 851. 
68 Id. 
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Judge-Executive telling a story of an astronaut that went into space and became convinced there 
was a “Divine God.”69 After the ACLU filed suit against the counties in federal court, both counties 
modified their displays to include 8 other documents either religious in theme or taken as an 
excerpt to highlight religious elements.70 When injunctions were entered by the District Court, 
both counties altered their displays again, this time removing the other religious texts and adding 
ones such as the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and Magna Carta, among others.71 
The Counties’ argued the Ten Commandments were part of a display on the foundation of 
American law and government.72 
 The Supreme Court in McCreary County made a very important point in determining that 
the displays were unconstitutional: in order for constitutionality to exist, the stated secular purpose 
of the displays must be genuine and the government’s principal objective.73 The majority opinion 
states “it is fair to add that although a legislature's stated reasons will generally get deference, the 
secular purpose required has to be genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious 
objective.”74 The Court felt that in the given sets of facts, with the Counties initially showing 
religious intent and displaying a religious object by itself only later adding more secular documents 
after the display came under fire, the Commandments were posted not with the aim of showing its 
influence of secular law, but to show its religious statement.75 
 One further display that came to be reviewed by the Supreme Court was a memorial of a 
Cross. In the case of American Legion v. American Humanist Association, the American Humanist 
Association filed suit in District Court over the Bladensburg Peace Cross, alleging that the cross 
 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 852-54. 
71 Id. at 855-56. 
72 Id. at 856-57. 
73 Id. at 864. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 869-70. 
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being on public land was a violation of the Establishment Clause.76 Planning for the construction 
of the Cross began after residents of the Maryland County where it is located formed a committee 
to build a war memorial for the soldiers who lost their lives during the First World War.77 The 
cross was chosen as the symbol portrayed in the monument because it had become an essential 
symbol of the war.78 As the Court explains, “after the First World War, the picture of row after 
row of plain white crosses marking the overseas graves of soldiers who had lost their lives in that 
horrible conflict was emblazoned on the minds of Americans at home.”79 
 The focus of the Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Alito, was centered around 
the difficulty associated with identifying the original purpose of some monuments, symbols, or 
practices that have ceremonial, commemorative, or celebratory purposes and the consideration that 
these objects and exercises can take on additional secular purposes over time.80 No one knows if 
the dominant motivation for the inclusion of a cross in many World War I memorials was due to 
its status as a symbol of the war and this far removed from the erections of these memorials, it 
would be almost impossible to do so.81 But one thing that may be determined is objects with 
religious meaning can take on new secular meanings over time.82 In the instance of the Cross, the 
object itself went from being strictly a religious mark associated with the Holy Trinity and the 
sacrifice of Jesus Christ in the Christian world to being a representation of the sacrifice of those 
that fought for the nation. Later, the memorials containing those crosses took on even further 
meaning. Those locations became places where communities could gather to commemorate and 
 
76 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2069 (2019). 
77 Id. at 2068. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 2074. The Cross was built in 1925 and had remained in the location for 89 years until the suit was filed. 
80 Id. at 2081-83. 
81 Id. at 2085. 
82 Id. 2082-83. 
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honor all of the soldiers who have fallen and continue to fall in the line of duty.83 Justice Alito also 
stressed the similarities between the situation of the Cross and the Ten Commandments in Van 
Orden and McCreary.84 He reiterates: “For believing Jews and Christians, the Ten Commandments 
are the word of God handed down to Moses on Mount Sinai, but the image of the Ten 
Commandments has also been used to convey other meanings. They have historical significance 
as one of the foundations of our legal system, and for largely that reason, they are depicted in the 
marble frieze in our courtroom and in other prominent public buildings in our Nation’s capital.”85 
Looking at these four cases, it is apparent the Supreme Court is tolerant of religious 
symbols on public land so long as the symbols can be understood to have taken on new meanings 
or roles that are more secular in nature.86 Religious symbols are also tolerated when they are used 
to commemorate historic events or national holidays and do not have the primary purpose of 
advancing religion.87 In the instances noted, religious symbols were not used to favor or advance 
religion, but as an acknowledgement of holidays, our nation’s roots, and the sacrifice of our fallen 
soldiers. These symbols have taken on civic meaning, and the Court, cognizant that they have 
meaning other than the purely religious, has been permissive toward the continuance of these 
practices.  
 
C. Despite Supreme Court Tolerance, These Practices Will Continue to Decline 
 
83 Id. at 2090. 
84 Id. at 2082-83. 
85 Id. at 2083. 
86 See Deborah K. Hepler, The Constitutional Challenge to American Civil Religion, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 93, 
108-09 (1996) (analyzing Lynch v. Donnelly, among other cases, for its involvement in judicial recognition of civil 
religion). 
87 See Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Religious Symbolism After McCreary and Van Orden, 12 TEX. 
REV. LAW & POL. 93 (2007) (discussing the reasoning implemented by the Supreme Court in both the Van Orden 
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The discussion above indicates that the Supreme Court is willing to allow Sunday Blue 
Laws if they possess secular, civic benefits to the public. Sunday Laws are beneficial in that they 
allow relief from the stresses of everyday life. They allow people to focus on spending time with 
family, getting a chance to rest from work, and taking time to participate in activities for which 
there may otherwise be little time. Especially in the modern day, when the day-to-day can move 
at such a fast pace, these laws allow for a much-needed time out. 
Similarly, the Court is willing to allow religious displays when their primary purpose is not 
one of advancement of religion. During the holiday season, many decorations go up across the 
nation. All are rooted in a holiday season which itself is religious in nature and adhered to by many 
a denomination. Monuments have historically been placed because of their importance to the 
nation and its heritage, despite being sacred to many of faith. 
Yet, based on what has been posited by the Court and by trends in our society, it appears 
that these practices will decline. Sunday Closing Laws over the years have been repealed all across 
the country and very few remain.88 Those that have survived are mostly restrictions and limitations 
on the Sunday sale and distribution of alcohol.89 While this is not a result of First Amendment 
interpretation by the Court, quite the opposite, it continues to happen. Part of this may be due to 
residents of various jurisdictions wanting more freedom in how they choose to spend their time. It 
may also be caused by the ineffectiveness of such legislation. In the alternative, there may be 
jurisdictions that did not want those laws in their books because of their initial ties to religion and 
felt it better to rid themselves of such entanglement. Whatever the case, Sunday Closing Laws are 
in decline. 
 
88 Blue Laws in the United States, WIKIPEDIA (Last Updated Nov. 6, 2019, 12:20 PM), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_laws_in_the_United_States. 
89 Id. 
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Some religious symbols on public land may suffer a similar fate, however a differentiation 
must be made between religious symbols that are used to commemorate holidays or the holiday 
season and other symbols located on public grounds. Holiday decorations during the season would 
seem likely to continue. As noted above, Christmas trees, candy canes, colorful lighting, 
gingerbread men, depictions of Santa Claus and many others are all seen by the Court as being 
secular in nature. Even the Christmas tree over time has come to be seen as symbolic of the season 
of giving and less as image born out of the Christian tradition. The use of creches and menorahs 
and other more overtly religious symbols may still be allowed given the context surrounding their 
use (and their constitutionality must be determined on a case-by-case basis). 
The opposite would appear to be the case with other symbols on public grounds. The focus 
of the Court on these symbols has typically been one of history and tradition. The Bladensburg 
Cross was allowed because its history suggested that it was built when the cross was a strong image 
associated with the War. That monument and the others above have stood for long periods of time, 
decades at the least. But what history and tradition would a new monument have? Justice Breyer 
says as much in his concurrence in the American Legion case, stating: “The Court appropriately 
‘looks to history for guidance,’ but it upholds the constitutionality of the Peace Cross only after 
considering its particular historical context and its long-held place in the community. A newer 
memorial, erected under different circumstances, would not necessarily be permissible under this 
approach.”90 This is particularly persuasive. How would the Court view a new erection of a cross 
for fallen servicemen and women as compared to the one that has stood for a century? How would 
it view a new erection of the tablets containing the Ten Commandments as opposed to the one that 
had stood for half a century? How would it view a different religious text that does not have the 
 
90 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. at 2115. 
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same historical importance in the foundation of this nation as do the Commandments? It seems 
highly unlikely that new monuments with religious depictions would continue to be erected given 
the Court’s continued focus on the nation’s history and tradition. 
 
III. The Continuation of Inherently Religious Practice: Legislative Prayer 
The Supreme Court has been willing to allow the practice of performing prayers and 
invocations to commence federal, state, and local legislative sessions by reason of its status as a 
traditional exercise dating back to the time of the Founding Fathers and its secular purpose of 
setting lawmakers in the right frame of mind at the outset of their undertakings. 
 What has commonly become referred to as legislative prayer is a convention adhered to by 
many legislatures at all levels of this country’s federalist government, most notably the United 
States Congress.91 It customarily involves the invitation by the legislature of a priest, rabbi, imam, 
or other religious figure to speak ahead of a legislative session and ordinarily includes a varying 
degree of religious rhetoric, which can either be sectarian or nonsectarian. While this practice has 
occurred since the foundation of this nation and continues to occur, seemingly unscathed, to this 
day, there have been challenges that have put to question the constitutionality of the routine. 
 The first notable remonstrance of legislative prayer came in the form of Marsh v. 
Chambers.92 The matter arose when a member of the Nebraska Legislature brought an action in 
the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska claiming that the practice by the 
Nebraska Legislature went against the protection afforded by the Establishment Clause and 
 
91 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014) (“When Marsh was decided, in 1983, legislative prayer 
had persisted in the Nebraska Legislature for more than a century, and the majority of the other States also had the 
same, consistent practice. Although no information has been cited by the parties to indicate how many local 
legislative bodies open their meetings with prayer, this practice too has historical precedent.”). 
92 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
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seeking to enjoin enforcement of the practice.93 The legislature had begun each of its official 
sessions with a prayer performed by a chaplain who was chosen twice annually via approval from 
one of the legislature’s councils.94 Notwithstanding the continuous necessity for approval, the 
same Presbyterian minister had been appointed as chaplain since 1965 (with the case only being 
heard in 1983) and was paid for his services at a sum of approximately $320 per month for each 
month that the legislature was in session, with the money coming from public funds.95 The District 
Court held that the prayers themselves did not violate the First Amendment but that the act of 
paying for the prayers with public funds did constitute a violation.96 On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eight Circuit took the analysis a step further and ruled that even the act of having 
a chaplain perform prayers to commence legislative sessions was, in and of itself, a violation.97 
 The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding the practice completely within the limits of 
the Establishment Clause.98 In the opinion of the Court, the facts that the one clergyman from a 
single religious denomination was used, that he was being paid with public expenses, and that the 
prayers followed the Judeo-Christian tradition were not enough to invalidate the practice.99 
 The Court’s primary explanation for the constitutionality of the practice was the history 
and tradition associated with it.100 First, the Court remarks that at all three levels at which the case 
was heard, including the United States Supreme Court, each of the proceedings began with an 
 
93 Id. at 785. 
94 Id. at 784. 
95 Id. at 785. 
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97 Id. at 786. The Appellate Court used the Lemon Test and determined that the practice breached all three elements: 
“the purpose and primary effect of selecting the same minister for 16 years and publishing his prayers was to 
promote a particular religious expression; use of state money for compensation and publication led to 
entanglement.” 
98 Id. at 793. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 786. Note that the Court completely throws away use of the Lemon Test, opposing the manner in which the 
Appellate Court had reach its conclusion. 
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invocation stating: “God save the United States and this Honorable Court.”101 Next, the Court 
observes that on the 22nd of September in 1789, just three days before the Bill of Rights was 
written, Congress had enacted legislation that authorized the appointment of paid chaplains to 
provide prayer at the inception of Congressional sessions.102 The Court does note that “standing 
alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees” and 
that “no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even 
when that span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it”,  but urges that, 
in the context of legislative prayer, more is at play here than historical patterns and two centuries 
of national practice cannot just be cast aside.103 
 The Supreme Court’s insight provides useful context to the issue at hand. It would make 
little sense for Congress to have intended for the practice of legislative prayer to be a violation of 
the protections afforded by the Constitution just days after taking the effort to legalize the practice. 
The complete backtracking on legislation has never been done in such an expedited fashion and 
with such vast repercussions as would be the case if Congress had intended to change its mind 
after three days (and using a Constitutional Amendment, of all things). 
 However, the Court’s analysis of the issue did not stop at whether the use and payment of 
a chaplain in the performance of legislative prayer is constitutional. It also took up the concern of 
whether a chaplain’s long tenure would show preference to a particular set of religious views.104 
Yet, instead of agreeing with the appellate court that such a long tenure advances the beliefs of a 
particular church, the Court posits that the minister was reappointed because of his qualities as a 
 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 788. 
103 Id. at 790. 
104 Id. at 793. 
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person and the quality of his performance.105 Chief Justice Burger, writing the opinion for the 
majority, states: “Absent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment stemmed from an impermissible 
motive, [the Court concludes] that his long tenure does not in itself conflict with the Establishment 
Clause.”106 
 In addition, the Court addressed the content of legislative prayers.107 It points out that as 
long as the opportunity for prayer is not exploited, used to proselytize, or advance or disparage 
any one particular set of religious beliefs, the contents of the prayers themselves are of no concern 
to judges.108  
 Although the Marsh case may seem to settle the dispute over whether prayer is allowable 
in government settings, the Supreme Court recently took up another case to further clarify the issue 
and to address the conclusions reached in Marsh. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Court saw 
another case that involved legislative prayer, though this case focused on the practices of a town 
council rather than a state legislature.109 The town of Greece, New York began to perform 
legislative prayer in 1999 after a newly appointed town supervisor wanted to replicate the practice 
he had found meaningful during his time in the county’s legislature.110 The method for choosing 
which chaplain would deliver the invocation was much less structured than the one performed by 
the Nebraska legislature in Marsh.111 A town employee would simply call the local congregations 
listed in a directory until an available chaplain was found and, later, a list was formed of those 
chaplains who had agreed to return in the future.112 Nearly all of the congregations in town were 
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Christian and all of the ministers who agreed to perform the prayers were also.113 Two residents 
later voiced their concerns that the prayers consistently relied on Christian themes to the exclusion 
of others who did not share those same beliefs.114 To alleviate these concerns, the town invited a 
Jewish person and the leader of the local Baha’i temple to deliver prayers as well as accepting a 
request to perform an invocation by a Wiccan priestess who had read press reports about the prayer 
controversy.115 Despite this effort, the two resident brought suit over the issue, alleging that the 
Establishment Clause was violated due the preference of Christians over those of other beliefs and 
for sponsoring sectarian prayer.116 
 The Supreme Court, in its decision, returns to the history of the practice as discussed in 
Marsh. The Court adds to what was established in Marsh by stating that the Framers considered 
legislative prayer as a subtle acknowledgement of religion’s continued role in society and that it 
posed no threat to establishment because lawmakers were not compelled to attend the prayers.117 
 The Court also addressed a misconception that the prayers themselves must be nonsectarian 
in order to conform with the constraints of the First Amendment. It asserts that “an insistence on 
nonsectarian or ecumenical prayer as a single, fixed standard is not consistent with the tradition of 
legislative prayer outlined in the Court’s cases” since the drafters of the First Amendment would 
have been acclimated to legislative prayers that featured explicitly religious themes.118 Also 
pointed out is the fact that Marsh never turned on neutrality of its content, with the Court saying 
that the fact “a prayer is given in the name of Jesus, Allah, or Jehovah, or that it makes passing 
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reference to religious doctrines, does not remove it from that tradition.”119 In actuality, the only 
mention by the Marsh Court of the content itself was done to warn that such prayer must not be 
used to proselytize.120 To end this discussion, the Court flips the argument for the nonsectarian 
standard on its head, hypothesizing that the standard would require government involvement in 
religious affairs to a much larger extent than just having chaplains come with their own prayers 
because it would require legislatures and courts to act as “supervisors and censors of religious 
speech.”121 
 An even more intriguing and original argument posited by Justice Kennedy, who wrote the 
opinion of the Court, is that the prayers themselves also add some sort of benefit to the lawmakers 
themselves. He writes that many “may find that a moment of prayer or quiet reflection sets the 
mind to a higher purpose and thereby eases the task of governing” and also that “legislative prayer 
lends gravity to public business, reminds lawmakers to transcend petty differences in pursuit of a 
higher purpose, and expresses a common aspiration to a just and peaceful society.”122 The prayers 
also connect the lawmakers to traditions going back to the foundation of the nation.123 
 By looking at these cases on legislative prayer, it certainly clear that the Supreme Court is 
willing to view prayer in a government setting as within the bounds of the First Amendment.124 It 
does not matter if the same rabbi, priest, or imam performs the ceremonial practice for years or 
that they are paid with taxpayer money to do so. It is not critical that the content of their speech be 
nondenominational. To the Court, the history and tradition associated with the practice, the idea 
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that the Framers had no intention of including it in their model of First Amendment protection, 
and that the practice may provide some benefit to lawmakers’ state of mind all point to the 
conclusion that legislative prayer should be afforded distance from Constitutional restraint. In fact, 
the only limiting factor to legislative prayer is that it must not be used in a way that takes advantage 
of the tradition via proselytization or the true favoring/advancement of a specific set of religious 
beliefs to the detriment of others. 
 The preceding cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court offers protection to legislative 
prayer from Constitutional enforcement.125 Weight is particularly given to the notion that the 
practice has gone as far back as the Continental Congress and the Framers of the Constitution. And 
this is the reason that the practice will continue. Over time, more and more jurisdictions began 
participating in the same tradition that has always taken place at the federal level in both Houses 
of Congress. The tradition will always be the same. The tradition will always have the same origin, 
with our Founding Fathers. Nothing about its prevalence and continued practice would suggest 
that it is declining or will decline in the future. In fact, as evidenced by the Town of Greece case, 
the practice may continue to expand.126 Legislative bodies at the municipal level may want to 
follow in the footsteps of their State and federal counterparts. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Civic religion is the concept that there exists religious influence and origins that continue 
to be prevalent in American society and government. It is the idea that some level of the historical 
religious impact has been and continues to be acknowledged by the system that governs the nation. 
But such acknowledgement of religion by government would seem to fly in the face of one of the 
principal objectives of the Bill of Rights, the protection of religious freedom. Yet it does not. The 
Supreme Court, on numerous occasions, has reasoned that religious entanglements are permissible. 
This is because of their civic meaning. They are things that hold importance in our society beyond 
the purely religious. They show us the diversity of people’s views, shine a light on the views of 
the country’s founders, and inform us of the history associated with the nation. And this is why 
the Court has been tolerant is such entanglements. 
Yet it seems that different practices that involve government interaction with religion have 
had and will continue to have differing trajectories and intensities. Sunday Blue Laws, despite 
being found constitutional on numerous occasions, are fading away. While not having the same 
religious connotations they once did, they also no longer have the same prevalence. Religious 
symbols on public land in the form of holiday decorations will indeed continue, but many of those 
decorations are ones that have lost their religious connection. And those that still have this 
connection must be qualified in context as part of larger displays or face being removed altogether. 
Religious symbols in the form of monuments face a much harder fate. It would appear that the 
erection of new monuments would fail to comport with the Court’s long and hard look at the 
history and traditions of the nation and its relation to the symbol included in the monument. That 
would certainly be case for any monument that denotes anything outside of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, for no other religion has had the same connection to the history of our government. In 
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contrast, history and tradition is precisely why legislative prayer continues and will continue to be 
a constant in legislative sessions. It is a practice that has been conducted for over two centuries 
and will seemingly go on for many more. Legislative prayer has the ability to go where religious 
symbols do not, it can adapt to diversity. We live in a society that is much more diverse that the 
one at the time of the Founders and legislative prayer can handle that diversity. An imam or rabbi 
or a Wiccan priestess or any other religious observer can preside over an invocation just as well as 
a Catholic priest. 
